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of the shock US. In this paradigm, the amygdala is
essential for the acquisition and retention of the CR
and this is true regardless of the CS modality (e.g.
auditory, visual, olfactory). Lesions of the hippocampus,
for example, do not impair fear conditioning using the
delay paradigm. However, if the delay paradigm is
changed to a trace paradigm by inserting a trace interval
of several seconds, lesions to both the amygdala and the
hippocampus severely impair the acquisition and reten-
tion of the fear CR.
3. Cerebral substrates of eyeblink conditioning
Eyeblink conditioning is the most widely studied form
of associative learning in mammals (Thompson 2005).
In the basic paradigm, a tone CS is paired with a reXex-
eliciting US such as a puV of air to the cornea. Initially
the CS does not elicit an eyeblink response. With
repeated pairing of the CS and US an association is
formed such that that presentation of the CS elicits an
eyeblink CR in advance of the US. In general, it takes
many more trials to establish a well-formed eyeblink
CR than it does the non-speciWc freezing CR in fear
conditioning. Extensive investigation into the neural
substrates of eyeblink conditioning using most often
rabbits, but also humans, monkeys, and rodents has
resulted in perhaps the most complete description of
mammalian memory formation to date.
The acquisition and retention of delay eyeblink con-
ditioning requires the cerebellum and associated brain-
stem structures. These structures are necessary and
suYcient for the formation and storage of the CR. No
forebrain structures, including the hippocampus, are re-
quired. For example, decerebrate rabbits with no remain-
ing forebrain tissue (i.e. after removal of cerebral cortex,
basal ganglia, limbic system, thalamus, and hypothal-
amus) exhibit normal retention of delay eyeblink condi-
tioning. Findings in humans are completely consistent
with the animal work. Thus, delay eyeblink conditioning
is impaired in patients with cerebellar or brainstem le-
sions, but intact in amnesic patients with damage that
includes the hippocampus (see *brain damage).
However, in eyeblink conditioning, changing delay
conditioning to trace conditioning by inserting a trace
interval as brief as 500–1000 ms substantially changes the
brain substrates and cognitive processes required to sup-
port this form of conditioning. For example, successful
trace eyeblink conditioning, like delay conditioning, re-
quires the cerebellum. However, trace conditioning
diVers from delay conditioning in that it also requires
the hippocampus and portions of neocortex. Thus, ac-
quisition and retention of trace conditioning are severely
disrupted in rabbits and rats when the hippocampus is
damaged and trace conditioning is also disrupted by
damage to portions of the prefrontal cortex. Again,
Wndings in humans are consistent. In amnesic patients
with damage that includes the hippocampus, trace eye-
blink conditioning is mildly impaired with a trace interval
of 500 ms, and severely impaired with a trace interval of
1000 ms.
4. Awareness and eyeblink conditioning in humans
From a behavioural perspective, work with experimen-
tal animals is limited to examining the acquisition,
storage, and generation of the CR. However, in humans
it is also possible to determine if the participants have
additionally developed an awareness that the CS comes
before the US and is predictive of the US. Thus, humans
have the potential to become aware of this contingency
and to develop an expectation of the US following the
presentation of the CS. The awareness and expectancy
can then be related to the CR in both the delay and
trace paradigms (Clark et al. 2002). In both delay and
trace conditioning paradigms, individuals sometimes
develop awareness regarding the stimulus contingencies
and sometimes do not. For the most commonly studied
forms of delay conditioning this awareness is superXu-
ous to the acquisition of the CR, presumably because
cerebellar and brainstem circuits can support perform-
ance. Trace conditioning is fundamentally diVerent.
Unlike delay conditioning, trace conditioning is strongly
related to the awareness of the CS–US contingency and
to the degree to which the US is expected.
It is possible that trace eyeblink conditioning may
additionally require the hippocampus and the develop-
ment of contingency awareness because the trace inter-
val makes it diYcult for the cerebellum to associate the
CS and the US. In trace conditioning, because the US
follows the CS by as much as 1000 ms the cerebellum
may not be able to maintain a representation of the
CS across the trace interval. If, however, the hippocam-
pus and neocortex have represented the stimulus
contingencies, then perhaps processed information con-
cerning the CS can be transmitted to the cerebellum at a
time during each trial that is optimal for cerebellar
plasticity.
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confabulation. ‘Confabulation’ as a technical term
was Wrst used by the German neurologists BonhoeVer,
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Pick, and Wernicke in the early 1900s for false memory
reports made by patients who suVered from a syndrome
that later came to known as KorsakoV’s amnesia. When
asked what they did yesterday, these patients do
not remember, but will report events that either did
not happen, or happened long ago. During the remain-
der of the 20th century, the use of the term was
gradually expanded to cover claims made by other
types of patients, many of whom had no obvious
memory problems, including patients who deny illness,
*commissurotomy (split-brain) patients, patients with
misidentiWcation disorders (who make false claims
about the identities of people), and patients with *schizo-
phrenia, as well as children and normal adults in
certain situations.
There are currently two schools of thought on the
proper scope of the concept of confabulation, those who
remain true to the original sense and so believe that the
term should only be applied to false memory reports, and
those who believe that the term can be usefully applied
to a broader range of disorders. An examination of
the etymology of the English word is not very helpful.
When those German neurologists at the turn of the
20th century began using ‘konfabulation’, they probably
meant that their memory patients were creating fables
when asked about their pasts. The patients were fabulists.
The technical deWnition of ‘confabulation’ the early
neurologists coined has three components: (1) confabu-
lations are false; (2) confabulations are reports; and
(3) confabulations are about memories. There are sign-
iWcant problems with each of these three criteria, how-
ever. First, relying on falsity alone to characterize
the problem in confabulation can produce arbitrary
results. If a KorsakoV ’s syndrome patient, when asked
what day of the week it is, happens to state correctly
that it is Saturday, or an Anton’s patient guesses cor-
rectly that the neurologist is holding up two Wngers, we
may still want to consider these to be confabulations.
They are only true out of luck—simply made up, rather
than the result of accurate tracking of the facts. Second,
the idea that confabulations are reports, or stories,
might be taken to imply that they are intrinsically lin-
guistic in nature, in that they are always reports in
the patient’s natural language, such as German, and
that hence confabulation is a strictly linguistic phenom-
enon. However, several researchers have categorized
non-linguistic responses as confabulatory. One group
had patients whose left hemispheres had been tempor-
arily anaesthetized point to fabric samples with one
hand to indicate which texture of fabric they had been
stimulated with on the other hand. The patients also
had the option of pointing to a question mark in trials in
which they had not been stimulated, a non-linguistic
version of answering ‘I don’t know’. Other researchers
applied the term ‘confabulation’ to the behaviour
of patients when they produced meaningless draw-
ings as if they were familiar designs. Similarly, another
group had patients reproduce from memory certain
drawings they had seen, and referred to cases in
which the patients added extra features to the drawings
which were not actually present as confabulations.
Finally, the problem with relating confabulations
to memories is that, even in KorsakoV ’s syndrome,
many confabulations are simply made up on the
spot, and have little to do with any actual memories.
That is, strictly speaking it is wrong to describe confabu-
lations as memory reports. They are rather Wctional
fables, or at least false claims alleged to be memory
reports.
Thus it seems that confabulations need not be false,
may not be reports, and need not be about memories. If
the original deWnition is problematic, that may be
one reason why it was ignored by those who later
described claims made by other, non-memory, patients.
Patients who deny that they are paralysed have been
claimed to confabulate when they provide reasons for
why they cannot move (‘My arthritis is bothering me’,
‘I’m tired of following your commands’). Another type
of patient will deny blindness and attempt to answer
questions about what he sees, producing what have
been called confabulations (‘It’s too dark in here’). Mis-
identiWcation patients have been said to confabulate
when asked what the motives of the ‘impostor’ are, or
why someone would go through all the trouble to
impersonate someone else (‘Perhaps my father paid
him to take care of me’). Similarly, when the left hemi-
spheres of split-brain patients attempt to answer ques-
tions without the necessary information (which is
contained in their right hemispheres), this has also
been called a confabulation.
This expansion forces several diYcult questions about
what had happened to the concept of confabulation.
Has it expanded so much as to become meaningless?
Do the new confabulation syndromes share anything
signiWcant with the classical memory cases? Some
writers on confabulation have despaired of the fact
that some of the confabulation syndromes involve
memory (KorsakoV’s, aneurysm of the anterior commu-
nicating artery), whereas others involve perception (de-
nial of paralysis or blindness, split-brain syndrome,
misidentiWcation disorders). Since both memory and
perception are knowledge domains, however, perhaps
this indicates that the broader sense of ‘confabulation’
has to do with knowledge itself. According to this
approach (Hirstein 2005), the brain’s implementation
of each knowledge domain—memory, perception, and
introspection—is subject to characteristic confabulation
syndromes.
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1. Confabulations about memories
These are a deWning characteristic of KorsakoV ’s syn-
drome and a similar syndrome caused by aneurysm of
the anterior communicating artery (Kopelman 1987).
Alzheimer’s patients will often produce memory con-
fabulations (see *dementia), and children up to a certain
age are also prone to reporting false memories, appar-
ently because their brain’s prefrontal areas have not
yet fully developed, while the Alzheimer’s patients pre-
frontal lobes have been compromised by the amyloid
plaque lesions. All of these confabulators have an initial
memory retrieval problem, coupled with a failure to
check and correct their false ‘memories’ ( Johnson and
Raye 1998). In contrast, there exist many memory pa-
tients with damage only to more posterior parts of the
memory system (e.g. to the hippocampus or other parts
of the temporal lobes) who freely admit that they can-
not remember, and are not at all prone to producing
confabulations (see *brain damage).
2. Confabulations about perceptions
Vision. Anton’s syndrome patients are at least partially
blind, but insist that they can see. Their posterior dam-
age typically involves bilateral lesions to the occipital
cortex, causing the blindness, coupled with prefrontal
damage, causing the inability to become aware of the
blindness. Split-brain patients will also confabulate when
asked in certain situations about what they perceived.
Somatosensation. The patients who deny paralysis have
a condition referred to as *anosognosia, meaning
unawareness of illness. They typically have a loss of
one or more somatosensory systems for the aVected
limb. Apparently, certain types of damage (e.g. to the
right inferior parietal lobe) can cause both the
somatosensory problem, and at least temporarily aVect
prefrontal functioning enough to cause the confabulated
denials of illness (Berti et al. 2005). The nature of the
connections between frontal areas and the right inferior
parietal lobe are less well understood. One possible
connection is that the high level prefrontal executive
processes based in the orbitomedial cortex are heavily
dependent on the high level perceptual processing
housed in the right inferior parietal lobe.
Person perception. Perceptual confabulations are also
issued by patients suVering from the misidentiWcation
syndromes (especially Capgras syndrome). These
syndromes may be caused by a deWcit in representing
the mind of the person who is misidentiWed (Hirstein
2008), coupled with an inability to realize the
implausibility of the impostor claim.
3. Confabulations about introspection
Confabulations about intentions and actions. Patients
who have undergone a *commissurotomy will tend
to confabulate about actions performed by the right
hemisphere. In a typical experiment, commands are
sent to the right hemisphere only, but the left
hemisphere, unaware of this, confabulates a reason for
why the left hand obeyed the command. Similar sorts of
confabulations can be elicited by brain stimulation. For
example, the patient’s cortex is stimulated, causing
her arm to move. When asked why the arm moved,
the patient claims she felt like stretching her arm.
*Hypnotized people may also confabulate, e.g. the
subject is given a hypnotic suggestion to perform a
certain action, but then confabulates a diVerent reason
for it when asked.
There are many cases of confabulations about actions
and intentions that do not involve the right hemisphere
or any obvious lateral element (Wegner 2002). When
Wilder PenWeld electrically stimulated peoples’ brains
in the 1950s, he was able to cause them to make move-
ments or emit sounds. Sometimes the patients would
claim that PenWeld was the cause of the movement.
They responded with remarks such as, ‘I didn’t do that.
You did’ and, ‘I didn’t make that sound. You pulled it out
of me’ (PenWeld 1975). In contrast, Hecaen et al. (1949)
electrically stimulated a diVerent area which caused the
patients to perform‘pill rolling’ motions, or clench and
unclench their Wsts. The patients claimed that they had
done this intentionally, but were unable to oVer a reason
for the action. Delgado’s brain stimulation patients
also claimed they had performed the actions voluntarily,
and confabulated a reason why. When Delgado (1969)
stimulated yet another area, producing ‘head turning
and slow displacement of the body to either side with a
well-oriented and apparently normal sequence, as if
the patient were looking for something’. When the pa-
tients were asked why they engaged in those actions,
genuine confabulations seemed to result:
The interesting fact was that the patient considered the evoked
activity spontaneous and always oVered a reasonable explan-
ation for it. When asked ‘What are you doing?’ the answers
were, ‘I am looking for my slippers,’ ‘I heard a noise,’ ‘I am
restless,’ and ‘I was looking under the bed’. (Delgado 1969).
Confabulations about emotions. False attributions of
emotions can count as confabulations. For example,
in one experiment, people were given an injection of
adrenaline (epinephrine) without their knowledge, but
attributed their inability to sleep to, e.g., nervousness
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about what they had to do the next day. We may all
be guilty of confabulating about our emotions on
occasion, perhaps due to the combination of our
feeling responsible for giving coherent accounts of our
emotions and the opacity of our emotions to cognition.
Classifying confabulation syndromes as malfunctions in
diVerent knowledge domains eliminates the problemwith
the falsity criterion. The problem is not somuch the falsity
of their claims, it is rather their overall unreliability, at least
in the aVected domain. Confabulation seems to involve
two phases of error. First, a Xawedmemory or response is
created. Second, even with plenty of time to examine the
situation and with urging from doctors and relatives, the
patient fails to realize that the response is Xawed. Our
brains create Xawed responses all the time. If I ask you if
you have ever been inside the head of the Statue of
Liberty, for instance, your brain is happy to provide an
image of a view from inside, even if you’ve never been
near the statue. But you are able to reject this as a real
memory, so you catch the mistake at the second phase.
The brain processes capable of checking and correcting
or rejecting Xawed representations are called executive
processes. Most executive processes reside in the prefrontal
lobes, including the dorsolateral frontal lobes, on the side
of the brain, the ventrolateral frontal lobes below them,
and the orbitofrontal lobes, located just above the eye
sockets (Rolls 1999, Fuster 2002). The following situations
require the intervention of executive processes: planning
or decision-making is required; there are no eVective
learned input–output links; a habitual response must be
inhibited; an error must be corrected; the situation is
dangerous; we need to switch between two or more
tasks; or, we need to recall something. In theory, given
the brain’s large number of knowledge sources, there are
many more confabulation syndromes than those listed
here, but they should all follow the same pattern: damage
to a knowledge system (either perceptual or mnemonic),
typically located in the temporal or parietal lobes, coupled
with damage to prefrontal executive processes responsible
for monitoring and correcting the representations deliv-
ered by that epistemic system.
4. The locus of damage in confabulation
There are several clues as to the nature and location
of the neurological damage in confabulation patients.
(1) Confabulation about paralysis of the left arm can
occur with stroke damage restricted to the right inferior
parietal cortex. (2) The patients with aneurysms of
the anterior communicating artery—a tiny artery near
the anterior commissure that completes the anterior
portion of the circle of Willis—provide our best clue
about the locus of the frontal problems in memory
confabulation (DeLuca and Diamond 1995). (3) Split-
brain patients confabulate about information perceived
by the right hemisphere. The right hemisphere, or lack
of communication with the right hemisphere, shows
up in all of the perceptual confabulations. Given
the right hemisphere’s greater role in producing and
perceiving emotions, there may be a lateral element to
the neural locus of confabulations about emotions. The
cerebral commissures, the corpus callosum, and the
anterior commissure are the three connecting Wbre bun-
dles between the two hemispheres. There are important
functional links between the posterior orbitomedial cor-
tex and the corpus callosum. Given the existence of
dense interconnections between the left and right orbi-
tomedial cortices, cutting their commissures may have
the same eVect of lesioning them directly.
5. The broader sense of ‘confabulation’
The following deWnition is based on the idea that con-
fabulation syndromes involve malfunctions in diVerent
knowledge domains, coupled with executive system
damage (Hirstein 2005):
Jan confabulates that p if and only if: (1) Jan claims that
p. (2) Jan believes that p. (3) Jan’s thought that p is ill-grounded.
(4) Jan does not know that her thought is ill-grounded.
(5) Jan should know that her thought is ill-grounded. (6) Jan is
conWdent that p.
‘Claiming’ is broad enough to cover a wide variety of
responses by subjects, including drawing and pointing.
The second criterion captures the sincerity of confabu-
lators. The third criterion refers to the problem that
caused the Xawed response to be generated. The fourth
criterion refers to the failure of the second phase, the
failure to reject the Xawed response. The Wfth criterion
captures the normative element of our concept of con-
fabulation. If the confabulator’s brain was functioning
properly, she would not make that claim. The last
criterion refers to another important aspect of confabu-
lators, the serene certainty they have in their commu-
nications, which may be connected to the frequent
Wnding of low or abolished sympathetic autonomic ac-
tivity in confabulating patients.
6. Confabulation and consciousness
Why does the anosognosic not notice what is missing?
One message carried by the phenomena one encounters
in a study of confabulation is that consciousness does
not contain labels saying, ‘an adequate representation
of your left arm is missing’ (denial); ‘there is a gap in
your memory here’ (memory syndromes); ‘you have no
information about why your left arm just pointed at a
picture of a cat’ (split-brain syndrome); ‘your represen-
tation of your father’s mind is missing’ (Capgras syn-
drome). The obvious hypothesis is that we confabulate
because both the conscious data and the checker of that
data are Xawed.
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Is confabulation then a type of *Wlling in, comparable
to the way that the brain’s visual system Wlls in the optic
blind spot? Confabulation might be considered Wlling
in at a higher, social level. It Wlls in social gaps in
information: the doctor has asked for information, for
example, so the patient supplies it. More sceptical
writers seem to see consciousness itself as a massive
confabulation, a user illusion. There may also be infor-
mation here relevant to another question: What is the
function of consciousness? The existence of confabula-
tion supports the idea that consciousness functions as a
testing ground, where thoughts and ideas can be
checked, before they are allowed to become beliefs or
participate in the causing of actions.
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confidence judgement. See signal detection theory
connectionist models. Connectionist models, also
known as parallel distributed processing (PDP) models,
are a class of computational models often used to
model aspects of human perception, cognition, and be-
haviour, the learning processes underlying such behav-
iour, and the storage and retrieval of information
from memory. The approach embodies a particular
perspective in cognitive science, one that is based on
the idea that our understanding of behaviour and of
mental states should be informed and constrained by
our knowledge of the neural processes that underpin
cognition. While neural network modelling has a history
dating back to the 1950s, it was only at the beginning
of the 1980s that the approach gained widespread recog-
nition, with the publication of two books (McClelland
and Rumelhart 1986, Rumelhart and McClelland 1986),
in which the basic principles of the approach were laid
out, and its application to a number of psychological
topics were developed. Connectionist models of cogni-
tive processes have now been proposed in many diVer-
ent domains, ranging from diVerent aspects of language
processing to cognitive control, from perception
to memory. The speciWc architecture of such models
often diVers substantially from one application to an-
other, but all models share a number of central assump-
tions that collectively characterize the ‘connectionist’
approach in cognitive science. One of the central fea-
tures of the approach is the emphasis it has placed
on mechanisms of change. In contrast to traditional
computational modelling methods in cognitive science,
connectionism takes it that understanding the mechan-
isms involved in some cognitive process should be
informed by the manner in which the system changed
over time as it developed and learned. Understanding
such mechanisms constitutes a signiWcant part of current
research in the domain (Elman et al. 1996; Mareschal
et al. 2007a, 2007b).
Connectionist models take their inspiration from the
manner in which information processing occurs in
the brain. Processing involves the propagation of
activation among simple units (artiWcial neurons) organ-
ized in networks, i.e. linked to each other through
weighted connections representing synapses or groups
thereof. Each unit then transmits its activation level
to other units in the network by means of its connec-
tions to those units. The activation function, that is, the
function that describes how each unit computes its
activation based on its inputs, may be a simple linear
function, but is more typically non-linear (e.g. a sigmoid
function).
1. Representation, processing, and learning in connec-
tionist networks
2. Connectionism and consciousness
1. Representation, processing, and learning in
connectionist networks
Representation can take two very diVerent forms in con-
nectionist networks, neither of which corresponds
to ‘classical’ propositional *representations. One form
of representation is the pattern of activation over the
units in the network. Units in some connectionist net-
works are speciWcally designated in advance by the
modeller to represent speciWc items such as identiWable
visual features, letters, words, objects, etc. Networks
that employ such units for all cognizable entities of
interest are called localist networks—the representation
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